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INTRODUCTION
For more than twenty years, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”),1 the pharmaceutical industry (“Industry”), Congress, and
the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”)2 have worked to craft
substantive and effective proposals3 to provide better pediatric4 drug
labeling and pediatric drug formulations to reduce off-label drug
use.5 Efforts have focused on three distinct classes of drugs regulated
1. The FDA established a web page to monitor the progress of various pediatric
testing initiatives. See FDA, Pediatric Medicine (visited June 1, 2000) <http://www.fda.
gov/cder/pediatric>. The web page is an excellent resource and contains links to
laws, regulations, policies, meetings, presentations, and other sites with pediatric
information. See id.
2. The AAP is an organization comprised of 50,000 primary care and specialty
pediatricians that helps to promote health care issues exclusively for the pediatric
population. See AAP, American Academy of Pediatrics Web Page (visited June 1, 2000)
<http://www.aap.org>.
3. See infra Part I (elaborating on the various initiatives undertaken by the
federal government to address pediatric issues).
4. For the purposes of this Comment, the term pediatric includes neonates
(birth to 1 month), infants (1 month to 2 years), children (2 to 12 years), and
adolescents (12 to 16 years). See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(“CDER”), FDA, Guidance for Industry: Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity under Section
505A of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (last modified Sept. 1999) at 6
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm> (defining appropriate age groups
for qualifying pediatric studies).
5. Off-label drug use is the use of a prescription drug in a manner different
than that instructed on the drug’s labeling. See Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use,
Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and
Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 188 (1999) (defining and discussing off-label
drug use). Drug labels, approved by the FDA, indicate the intended uses of a
particular product and may also disclaim certain uses of a product. See id. at 186-87.
If a consumer uses a product in a manner neither approved by the FDA nor tested by
the manufacturer, such an act may discharge the manufacturer from liability,
provided adequate testing was undertaken in the pre-approval phases of
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by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”):6 (1) new
development. See id. at 224. Approximately 80% of all new drugs and drugs
currently on the market have not been adequately tested for use in pediatric
populations. See Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and Food and Drug
Admin. Reform: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House Commerce
Comm., 105th Cong. 10-11 (1997) (testimony of Sanford N. Cohen, Associate
Director of the National Institute for Environmental Health Services at Wayne State
University on behalf of AAP) (calling for congressional assistance in urging the FDA
to require pediatric studies in new drugs expected to be used by children). As a
result, physicians must face an ethical dilemma regarding the off-label use of a drug.
On the one hand, if a drug’s label does not indicate the proper dosage information
for use in pediatric patients, and a physician refuses to prescribe the product because
of the absence of pediatric dosing information, that physician may be liable for
malpractice. On the other hand, a physician places the health of his patient at risk
when he prescribes a drug to a patient for whom the product is not approved. See
Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Unapproved Uses of Approved
Drugs: The Physician, the Package Insert, and the Food and Drug Administration: Subject
Review, 98 PEDIATRICS 143-45 (1996). In many instances physicians make an educated
guess as to the correct dosage for a given drug. Such educated guesses typically do
not harm the health of adults, but could have dire consequences for children.
Children are not simply small adults, for they absorb and metabolize drugs at
different rates than adults. See SUMNER J. YAFFE, M.D. & JACOB V. ARANDA, M.D.,
PH.D., F.R.C.P.(C), PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY: THERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE 3
(2d ed. 1992) (describing the increased awareness that drug actions depend on both
the intrinsic qualities of the drug and its interaction with the host). In addition, due
to the lack of clinical studies in pediatric patients, physicians may not be aware of all
possible adverse drug reactions that might occur if the pediatric patient is using
other types of medication. See Charles J. Cote et al., Is the “Therapeutic Orphan” About
to Be Adopted?, 98 PEDIATRICS 118 (1996).
The dearth of pediatric labeling that has led to off-label prescribing practices is, in
large part, due to ethical issues that arise when considering whether to enroll
children in clinical drug studies, and may present an obstacle to implementing the
statute and regulations described in this Comment. See FDA Considers Ethics of Putting
‘Normal’ Children in Clinical Trials, FDA WEEK, July 2, 1999, at 1, 10 (quoting Dianne
Murphy, Director, Office of Drug Evaluation IV, the Food and Drug Administration,
as saying “ensuring that [clinical] studies are conducted ethically on children is the
single greatest barrier to implementation of both the FDA’s pediatric rule and
[FDAMA Section 111]”). Pediatric patient safety also may be jeopardized by
increasing pressure on companies to conduct studies in pediatric patients and
competition for pediatric patients to participate in the studies. See id. at 10. As
children are an especially vulnerable population, they demand greater protection of
their rights. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Drugs: Guidelines for the
Ethical Conduct of Studies to Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric Populations, 95 PEDIATRICS 286-87
(1995) (arguing that because children are an especially vulnerable subpopulation in
the United States, they must be protected from the violation of their individual rights
and from undue exposure to risk). Although there are currently ethical guidelines
for studying drugs in children, it is necessary to develop research protocols that
specifically address children and clinical studies. See id. at 287. As the FDA drafts
guidance on studying drugs in children, it will have to consider a myriad of issues,
including the existence of certain state laws (i.e., California) that prohibit the use of
an experimental drug on children unless the drug can maintain or improve the
health of the child. See generally Memorandum from the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) 8 (Oct. 5, 1999) (on file with the American
University Law Review) (commenting on new provisions and rules regarding pediatric
drug studies) (enclosed with letter from Marjorie E. Powell, Assistant General
Counsel, PhRMA, to Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, and Kathryn C. Zoon,
Ph.D., Director, Center for Biologies Evaluation and Research, FDA).
6. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301 et seq. (1994)) (requiring new drugs to receive premarket approval from the
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drugs;7 (2) currently marketed drugs;8 and (3) off-patent drugs.9 As a
result of the efforts of the FDA, Industry, and the AAP, Congress has
implemented two major policies. First, in November 1997, Congress
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
(“FDAMA”),10 which included Section 111, Pediatric Exclusivity
(“FDAMA Section 111”).11 Second, on December 2, 1998, the FDA
promulgated a final rule, “Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to
Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological
Products in Pediatric Patients” (“Final Rule”).12
FDAMA Section 111 offers six months of extended patent life13 to
FDA).
7. See FDCA § 505A(a); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(a) (Supp. 1997) (discussing the various
requirements a new drug must fulfill to receive market exclusivity for pediatric
studies).
8. See id. § 505A(c), 21 U.S.C. § 355a(c) (Supp. 1997) (discussing various
requirements for already-marketed drugs to receive market exclusivity for pediatric
studies).
9. Under the FDCA, new and currently-marketed drugs enjoy a period of
market exclusivity during which time the life of the product’s patent tolls. During
the period of exclusivity, the FDA cannot approve a generic copy of the original
product, thereby creating a monopoly for the owner of the drug patent. Once a
product’s patent life expires, it is referred to as off-patent. See generally DONALD O.
BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS
§ 4.02(A), at 4-3 (5th ed. 1999) (describing provisions that may delay the approval of
a competitor’s product).
10. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (Supp.
1997)) (intending, among other things, to improve the regulation of food, drugs,
devices, and biological products). The FDAMA is a compilation of smaller pieces of
legislation meant to reform the FDCA, the two most important of which are the
pediatric incentive provision and the reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act (“PDUFA”). See Letter from Representatives James C. Greenwood (R-Pa.)
and Richard Burr (R-N.C.) to Jane E. Henney, M.D., Commissioner, FDA 1 (May 26,
1999) (on file with the American University Law Review) (expressing a desire for the
FDA to implement Section 111 which creates incentives for conducting pediatric
drug studies). The PDUFA allows drug sponsors to pay user fees to the FDA. In
exchange, the FDA hires additional drug application reviewers and implements
electronic document submission to expedite the drug approval process. See FY 1998
PDUFA FINANCIAL REPORT 1 (providing an overview of PDUFA II and establishing
future initiatives and goals).
11. See FDAMA § 111 (codified at FDCA § 505A, 21 U.S.C. § 355a (Supp. 1997))
(extending market exclusivity for drug manufacturers who identify drugs beneficial
to children and conduct pediatric studies).
12. See Final Rule: Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and
Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed.
Reg. 66,632 (1998) (codified in scattered sections at 21 C.F.R. (1998)) [hereinafter
Final Rule] (requiring manufacturers of certain products to provide data and
information to support their directions for use in children).
13. A U.S. patent term runs for either 17 or 20 years. All patents in force or filed
as of June 8, 1995 have either a patent for 17 years from the date when the patent
was granted, or 20 years from the date of the first filing of the patent application,
whichever option is longer. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994)). All
patents filed after June 8, 1995 have a patent of 20 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(1994). Because the FDA will not review applications for generic copies of a drug for
six months after its statutory patent life expires, FDAMA Section 111 essentially
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innovator drug14 sponsors who conduct pediatric studies15 on new and
currently-marketed drugs.16 This provision sunsets in 2002.17 In
contrast, the FDA’s Final Rule compels drug sponsors to assess the
safety and efficacy of new and currently-marketed drugs and
biological products18 in pediatric populations.19
The carrot offered in the FDAMA to innovator drug sponsors who
conduct pediatric studies complements the FDA’s mandatory Final
Rule. The former affords the Industry the opportunity to provide
new and currently-marketed drug products that should be tested for
use among pediatric patients in exchange for patent exclusivity, and
the latter allows the FDA to require that all drugs and indications are
tested in pediatric populations regardless of their market potential.20
extends the life of the term of the patent by six months. See generally BEERS, supra
note 9, § 4.02(A), at 4-3 (describing various types of market exclusivity).
14. An innovator drug, also referred to as a pioneer drug, is the original version
of a patented drug product that the FDA approves for a specific therapeutic purpose.
Subsequent versions approved for marketing after the patent term of the innovator
drug expires are referred to as generic copies. See BEERS, supra note 9, § 1.01, at 1-3
(explaining the difference between pioneer drug and generic drug).
15. Pediatric studies entail “at least one clinical investigation (that . . . may
include pharmacokinetic studies) in pediatric age groups in which a drug is
anticipated to be used.” CDER, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Qualifying for Pediatric
Exclusivity under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, at 3 (last
modified Sept. 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm> (citing the
definition of pediatric studies under section 505A, which is codified at section
505A(g) of the FDCA). Pharmacokinetics refers to the way in which a human body
handles a drug. For example, children metabolize, excrete, and absorb drugs
differently than adults. A pharmacokinetic study measures and calculates those
differences. See Medical Policy Coordinating Committee (MPCC), FDA, Draft
Guidance for Industry: General Considerations for Pediatric Pharmacokinetic Studies for
Drugs and BiologicalProducts, at 2-4 (Nov. 1998) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
index.htm> (noting the need for pharmacokinetic studies to determine what drug
dosage in the pediatric population is as safe and effective as in adults).
16. See FDCA § 505A(a), (c); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(a), (c) (Supp. 1997) (describing
the patent extension that drug manufacturers may earn by conducting pediatric
studies).
17. See FDCA § 505A(j); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(j) (Supp. 1997) (stating that this sixmonth exclusivity period will only apply to drug manufacturers who submit
applications for their respective drugs to the FDA on or before January 1, 2002, or if
certain other conditions are met).
18. A biologic or biological product is “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin,
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or
analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other
trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or
cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” Public Health Service Act, 42
U.S.C. § 262(i) (1994) (defining biological product). The FDA regulates biological
products in conjunction with the Public Health Service Act, and ensures the safety
and efficacy of biological products through various licensing requirements. See 21
C.F.R. pts. 600-680 (1999) (covering biologies).
19. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,633 (requiring that manufacturers of both
new and marketed drugs and biological products evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of their products).
20. See United States Food and Drug Admin. Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm.
Meeting of the Pediatric Subcomm., 20-26 (1999) [hereinafter Anti-Infective Drugs
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Numerous questions abound, however, as to the future status and
implementation of the Final Rule after the FDAMA Section 111
marketing exclusivity incentive expires in 2002.21 The Industry fears
that once it demonstrates an ability to conduct pediatric studies with
a market incentive, and after FDAMA Section 111 sunsets, the FDA
will possess only the stick-like Final Rule with which to mandate
further pediatric testing.22 Conversely, the FDA is concerned that
once FDAMA Section 111 expires, mandatory testing will remain as
the only alternative to continue and enhance the availability of drugs
for pediatric patients.23 The FDA’s goal, which is to increase the
availability of drugs to pediatric patients, does not justify the means
chosen by it to reach that end. The implementation of the Final Rule
will not increase the availability of drugs to pediatric patients, but
rather will stymie the growth of pediatric formulations.24
This Comment argues that the FDA lacks the authority to mandate
pediatric testing via the Final Rule.25 Further, this Comment
demonstrates that the FDA intends to use FDAMA Section 111
market exclusivity as a carrot for Industry compliance with the Final
Rule. This objective is made apparent in the similarity of the FDA’s
criteria for a drug to qualify for market exclusivity under FDAMA
Section 11126 and the criteria that would invoke mandatory testing

Advisory Comm.] (statement of Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director for
Pediatrics, FDA) (discussing the FDA’s devotion to integrating FDAMA Section 111
and the Final Rule); see also Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634 (noting the FDA’s
diminished need to require studies of currently-marketed drug products due to the
existence of a list that contains approved drugs, which may benefit pediatrics if
further information is obtained).
21. See Jill Wechsler, Washington Report: Push & Pull Over Pediatric Medicines,
PHARM. EXECUTIVE, July 1998, at 18, 20 (reporting Industry fear that a voluntary
approach to conducting pediatric studies may be delayed in preference for a
mandatory approach).
22. See id. (discussing the Industry’s suspicion of the FDA’s approach to
implementing FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule).
23. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632 (discussing the failure of past FDA
attempts to persuade drug sponsors to provide pediatric use information on their
product’s labeling). But see Letter from Alan F. Holmer, President, PhRMA, to FDA
Dockets Management Branch, Docket No. 97N-0165, 2-13 (Nov. 13, 1997) (on file at
the FDA Dockets Management Branch in Rockville, MD) (noting the success of the
FDA’s past attempts to increase pediatric information).
24. See Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, Biotechnology Industry
Organization, to Jane E. Henney, M.D. Commissioner, Food and Drug
Administration 1 (June 22, 1999) (on file with the American University Law Review)
(noting that “[i]ll-advised application of the [Final Rule] could stifle innovation and
lead to results quite at odds with the rule’s intent”).
25. See infra Part II.A (arguing that under the FDCA, the FDA lacks the authority
to mandate pediatric studies from the Industry).
26. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (listing the requirements a drug
must fulfill to qualify for FDAMA Section 111).
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under the Final Rule,27 the definition of “drug” as active moiety,28 and
the lack of expedience the FDA shows in granting market exclusivity
from a rather long list of drugs that qualify for pediatric exclusivity
under FDAMA Section 111.29 In addition, this Comment explains
that an Industry challenge to the FDA’s authority to mandate
pediatric studies will coalesce and exacerbate negative public
sentiment against the Industry.30 Finally, this Comment recommends
that the most prudent option, and the option that best serves the
interest of pediatric patients, is a compromise between the Industry
and the FDA, whereby the Industry contributes to pediatric studies
for off-patent drugs and the FDA agrees to recommend that the
United States Congress reauthorize FDAMA Section 111 incentives
for an additional five years.31
This Comment begins by providing historical information on both
the legislative and regulatory attempts to find parents for the
“therapeutic orphan”32 that resulted in the passage of FDAMA Section
111 and the promulgation and implementation of the Final Rule. In
addition, Part II addresses the unstable statutory foundation upon
27. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (listing the requirements a drug
must fulfill to qualify for the FDA to mandate pediatric studies under the Final Rule).
28. The active moiety is the part of the drug product or substance that achieves
the intended therapeutic or pharmacological effect. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)
(1999) (defining terms related to new drug market exclusivity); see also infra Part
II.B.2 (noting the effects of recent litigation surrounding FDAMA Section 111).
29. See infra Part II.B.3 (arguing that the FDA’s lack of expediency in granting
market exclusivity is contrary to its initiative to improve pediatric health and that the
FDA intends to lure the Industry into compliance with the Final Rule); see also List of
Drugs for Which Additional Pediatric Information May Produce Health Benefits in
the Pediatric Population, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,733 (1998) [hereinafter Priority List]
(identifying drugs that require further information for determining whether they
may be used safely and effectively in the pediatric population). The official Priority
List is located on the FDA’s pediatric web site. See List of Approved Drugs for Which
Additional Pediatric Information May Produce Health Benefits in the Pediatric Population
(visited Sept. 10, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/peddrugsfinal.htm>
[hereinafter Official Priority List].
30. See infra Part II.C (discussing the potential benefits and risks inherent in an
Industry challenge to the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric studies).
31. See infra Part III (recommending that the FDA and the Industry cooperate to
reauthorize FDAMA Section 111 for an additional timeframe in exchange for studies
on off-patent drugs).
32. Children have long been referred to as “therapeutic orphans” among
professionals in the pediatric community due to a general lack of medications
specifically formulated for their different metabolisms. See, e.g., John T. Wilson, An
Update on the Therapeutic Orphan, 104 PEDIATRICS 585, 585-86 (1999) (tracing the
origin and use of the “therapeutic orphan” concept); see also, e.g., Cote, supra note 5,
at 120 (citing an article from as far back as 1968, which referred to pediatric patients
as “therapeutic orphans”). The former article, written by Dr. Wilson, is part of a
supplement to the September 1999 edition of the AAP’s journal Pediatrics entitled
“the Therapeutic Orphan 30 Years Later.” Each paper considers different aspects of
providing information for pediatric use. See generally The Therapeutic Orphan 30 Years
Later, 104 PEDIATRICS 581-645 (1999).
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which the FDA bases its authority to mandate pediatric testing and
the difficulty the Industry faces in its challenge of the FDA’s
authority. Part II examines the consequences the Industry likely will
confront when FDAMA Section 111 sunsets in 2002. Part III
recommends that the Industry and the FDA reach a compromise to
fulfill the needs and goals of the Industry, the FDA, and most
importantly the children, which is to ensure that the entire universe
of available drugs are available to pediatric populations.
I.

PEDIATRIC TESTING: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE
“THERAPEUTIC ORPHAN”

Attempts to protect pediatric health and provide safe and effective
products are the hallmarks of change and innovation to the FDCA.33
Strides in clinical pharmacology have identified how a milieu of
factors affect the safety and effectiveness of a drug in different host
patients.34 For example, doctors should not consider pediatric
patients as “small adults” and prescribe them drugs on an off-label
basis.35 Thus, both FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule represent
a culmination of the most recent initiative to include pediatric
labeling on drugs and to adopt the “therapeutic orphan.”36
A. Past Attempts to Acquire Pediatric Labeling
The initiative to improve pediatric labeling of drugs began in
earnest in 1974.37 The FDA and the AAP entered into an agreement
33. In 1938, Congress added safety requirements to the FDCA as a result of
numerous deaths, mostly children, resulting from the use of a solvent in an untested
drug called Elixir Sulfanilamide. Under the Pure Food Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 1-13,
34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938), the predecessor of the FDCA, a product did not have to
meet safety requirements to be placed on the market. In 1962, Congress added
efficacy requirements to the FDCA. See Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris
Amendments), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C. (1998)) (changing sections of the FDCA dealing with the safety,
effectiveness, and reliability of drugs). The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments were
precipitated by thousands of birth defects that occurred as a result of the use of
thalidomide by pregnant women to relieve morning sickness. See Elizabeth M.
Rutherford, The FDA and “Privatization”: The Drug Approval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 203, 212 (1995) (recounting the thalidomide tragedy).
34. See YAFFE & ARANDA, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that research has revealed that
different stages in pediatric development can affect how a pediatric patient
metabolizes a particular drug, and that such metabolization is vastly different from
how adults metabolize a drug).
35. See id. (noting that drugs may react differently in children than in adults); see
also Cote, supra note 5, at 122 (“The unapproved or off-label use of drugs is not an
acceptable alternative to documentation of the safety and efficacy of drugs used by
the pediatric population.”).
36. See infra Part I.B-C (discussing the development of both FDAMA Section 111
and the final rule).
37. See Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, General Guidelines
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to develop a solution for the absence of drugs in the market labeled
for pediatric use. The AAP’s Committee on Drugs issued general
guidelines for the evaluation of drugs to be used in pediatric
patients.38 The FDA subsequently adopted these and incorporated
them into clinical guidelines in 1977.39
In 1979, the FDA
promulgated a “Pediatric Use” regulation that stipulated
requirements to which drug sponsors had to adhere in order to
include pediatric uses on product labels.40 This regulation required
drug sponsors to include information on a product’s labeling
collected from clinical studies performed during a product’s safety
and effectiveness evaluation.41 In 1994, the FDA subsequently
amended this 1979 regulation,42 thereby requiring sponsors to modify
drug labels based on an assessment of current pediatric data to seek
either a labeling change for pediatric use or to include a statement,
such as: “Safety and effectiveness in pediatric patients have not been
established.”43 Thus, the amended regulation gave the Industry the
for the Evaluation of Drugs to be Approved for Use During Pregnancy and for Treatment of
Infants and Children (Evanston Ill., 1974), cited in YAFFE & ARANDA, supra note 5, at 7.
38. See id.
39. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEW, PHS, FDA, PUB. NO. 77-3041, GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF DRUGS IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN
(1977) (listing the guidelines for the evaluation of drugs in pregnant women, infants,
and children).
40. See Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434 (1979) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201 and 202) (noting that the purpose of the final rule was to establish
labeling standards for all prescription drugs).
41. See id. at 37,459. The regulation states that:
The ‘Clinical Studies’ and ‘References’ sections of the prescription drug
labeling are intended to provide health care professionals with basic
information on the safe and effective use of the drug that is too detailed for
inclusion in the labeling for the drug. [This rule establishes that] at the
option of the person responsible for the labeling . . . [c]linical studies and
references may also be cited in other sections of prescription drug labeling
when the citation is essential to an understandable presentation of the
available information . . . . A clinical study or reference that is primarily
directed to an unapproved use of the drug would not serve [to contribute to
an understanding of the labeled uses of the drug, and] would not be
appropriately cited in prescription drug labeling.
Id.
42. See Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs; Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 59 Fed.
Reg. 64,240 (1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(9)(vi) (1994)) (responding to
the inadequacy of drug labels in supplying information for use in pediatric
populations).
43. See id. at 64,241. This regulation required the label to include “any
limitations on the pediatric indication, need for specific monitoring, specific hazards
of the drug, differences between pediatric and adult responses to the drug, and
other information related to the safe and effective use of the drug in pediatric
patients.” Id. Where substantial evidence failed to support a specific pediatric
indication or a pediatric use statement for a particular pediatric subgroup, the
regulation required the labeling to include a statement characterizing the limitation,
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option to conduct pediatric research and include the data on labels.
As the FDA did not mandate the Industry to include pediatric data
on labels, both the 1979 “Pediatric Use” regulations and the 1994
modification removed the incentive for drug sponsors to conduct
clinical studies.44 Even though the purpose of the 1994 amendment
to the regulation was to counter this result,45 it failed to generate the
inclusion of substantive pediatric information on product labels.46 As
a result, the Industry did not study its products for use in pediatric
patients.47 Both the Clinton Administration,48 through the FDA, and
such as “[s]afety and effectiveness in pediatric patients [below the age of (_)] have
not been established.” Id.
44. See Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 29-30 (statement
of Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director of Pediatrics, FDA) (noting that FDA’s
efforts in the 1970s and the agency’s 1994 effort to include pediatric information on
drug labels did not result in sufficient pediatric information because the Industry was
given an option to conduct the studies). Drug studies on children often pose
significant technical obstacles, such as obtaining informed consent from reluctant
parents, and overcoming manufacturers’ and clinical investigators’ concerns about
liability. See Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and FDA Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 83
(1997) (statement of Gordon M. Binder, Chairman and CEO, Amgen Inc.) (listing
reasons that drugs are not studied in children). These obstacles deterred pediatric
drug studies because sponsors who conducted such studies risked incurring an
economic disadvantage against sponsors who did not. See id. (implying that sponsors
are influenced by economic protection). To offset these disincentives, the Industry
receive market protection. See id. (arguing that legislation that provides market
protection in return for testing in children will provide clear economic incentives for
such testing).
45. See Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs; Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 64,241 (“The final rule revises the current ‘Pediatric use’ subsection of the
professional labeling requirements for prescription drugs to provide for the
inclusion of more complete information about the use of a drug in the pediatric
population . . . .”).
46. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632 (noting that in response to the 1994
“Pediatric use” rule, 430 pediatric labeling supplements were submitted to the FDA,
and of those submitted about 75% did not significantly improve pediatric use
information); Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to Those Most in Need: The FDA’s
Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 131 (1997)
(arguing that the “Pediatric use” regulations did not result in any changes to
pediatric testing as evidenced by the fact that at least 71% of drugs still lack adequate
pediatric dosing information).
47. The AAP found that between 1984 and 1995, only 20% of new drugs
approved by the FDA were indicated for use in children. See Off-Label Drug Use and
FDA Review of Supplemental Drug Applications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong. 109 (1996) (statement of Ralph Kauffman, M.D., Professor of
Pediatrics and Pharmacology at the University of Missouri, Kansas City and Director
of Medical Research at the Children’s Mercy Hospital in Kansas City, on behalf of the
AAP) (stating that only approximately 20% of all drugs marketed in the United
States have been labeled for use by infants and children and that since 1962, 80% or
more of approved drugs have been labeled for adult use with a disclaimer that they
are not approved for use by children).
48. See Remarks by the President at Event on Pediatric Dosage (last modified Aug. 13,
1997)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov.urires/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/
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Congress took steps to remedy this problem. The FDA and Congress,
however, each approached the problem from vastly different
perspectives. On the one hand, Congress sought to create incentives
for drug sponsors,49 which resulted in FDAMA Section III. On the
other hand, the FDA sought to mandate clinical testing and the
subsequent labeling of drugs for pediatric patients, which resulted in
the Final Rule.50
B. FDAMA Section 111—Pediatric Exclusivity
The first major revision of the FDCA to occur since 1962 is the
FDAMA.51 The development of FDAMA Section 111 began in 1990,
when attendees at a workshop at the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”)52
suggested market-based incentives to increase pediatric studies and
labeling.53
Subsequent to the IOM workshop, Industry
1997/8/13/9.text.1> (announcing the Administration’s proposed rule to mandate
pediatric studies); see also Press Briefing by President’s Principal Health Care Advisor, Chris
Jennings (last modified Aug. 13, 1997) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov.urires/
I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/8/13/3.text.1> (commenting that because of
the decline in pediatric testing and the ineffectiveness of the “Pediatric Use” rule,
the Administration believed a mandatory rule was the only solution to increasing
pediatric studies).
49. See infra Part I.B (discussing the development of FDAMA Section 111).
50. See infra Part I.C (discussing the development and implications of the Final
Rule).
51. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text (describing the sponsor market
exclusivity and the FDA publication provisions of the FDAMA); see also Drug
Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendments), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1998)) (requiring drug
sponsors to meet certain requirements with respect to safety, effectiveness and
reliability, drug names, advertising, factory inspection, registration of establishments,
and patent information to gain FDA approval to market drugs in the United States).
See generally supra note 33 (discussing the 1938 and 1962 amendments to the FDCA).
52. The Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) is part of the National Academy of
Sciences, a private, non-governmental organization. The mission of the IOM is to
advance and disseminate scientific knowledge to the government, the corporate
sector, the professions, and the public in an effort to improve human health. See
About the Institute of Medicine (visited Sept. 10, 1999) <http://www4.nas.edu/IOM/
IOMHome.nsf/Pages/About+the+IOM> (providing general information about the
purpose of the IOM).
53. See INSTITUTE OF MED., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DRUG DEVELOPMENT
AND THE PEDIATRIC POPULATION: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 12 (1991) (“Marion Finkel
clarified the industry perspective of the FDA guidelines promoting pediatric drug
studies . . . . Pharmaceutical industry resources will be required by the initiatives
therefore, incentives, such as exclusivity or some patent term extension, would be
valuable.”). This author spoke with Marion J. Finkel, M.D., a participant in the IOM
workshop. See Telephone Interview by Kurt R. Karst with Marion J. Finkel, M.D.,
Pharmaceutical Clinical and Regulatory Consultant, May 12, 1999. Dr. Finkel noted
that the IOM workshop was one of the first substantive discussions suggesting that a
period of exclusivity should be offered to pharmaceutical companies that conduct
pediatric studies on their products. See id. Subsequent to the IOM meeting, Dr.
Finkel approached the staff of Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) and
recommended the introduction of legislation that would increase pediatric labeling
of drugs through market exclusivity incentives. See id.
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representatives urged Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) to
introduce the “Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act” (“BPCA”).54
The BPCA was introduced in subsequent sessions of Congress,55 and
was finally passed and signed into law as part of the FDAMA in 1997.56
FDAMA Section 111 provides six months of market exclusivity to
innovator drug sponsors who perform clinical studies of specific
drugs in pediatric patients.57 Moreover, these sponsors can earn an
additional six month exclusivity period in certain circumstances.58
The six months of additional patent protection is not limited to the
specific drug tested, but is applicable to the drug’s active moiety,59 or,
in other words, the part of the drug’s make-up that causes its
physiological or pharmacological action.60 Drug sponsors can earn
market exclusivity only for products listed in the “Orange Book”61 that
are eligible for market exclusivity or protected under either the Drug
54. See S. 3337, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing deferred effective dates
for approval of applications under drug provisions). The purpose of the BPCA was
to encourage the innovator Industry to conduct pediatric testing on drug products
not solely intended for use in children—e.g. drugs then prescribed on an off-label
basis for children—in exchange for six months of market exclusivity. See 138 CONG.
REC. S16,998-99 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). Kassebaum
stated that:
[T]his legislation creates incentives for drug manufacturers to test the
impact of drug products in pediatric populations. . . . The problem . . . is
that there is little incentive for manufacturers to perform studies for
medications which they do not intend to market for children and which are
therefore expected to return little additional revenue from that source.
Id.
55. See H.R. 1727, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); S. 713, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1997); H.R. 4277, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); S. 2178, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996); H.R. 4427, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2010, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
The 104th Congress also included the BPCA in its initial attempt to reform the
FDCA. See S. 1477, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
56. See FDCA § 505A; 21 U.S.C. § 355a (Supp. 1997) (providing market
exclusivity for sponsors who conduct pediatric studies of drugs). The inclusion of
the BPCA in the FDAMA was a priority issue for Congress, second only to the
reauthorization of the PDUFA. See supra note 10 (noting the importance of FDAMA
Section 111 in the passage of the FDAMA).
57. See FDCA § 505A(a), (c); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(a), (c) (Supp. 1997) (extending
market exclusivity for certain sponsors who conduct pediatric drug studies).
58. See FDCA § 505A(h); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(h) (Supp. 1997) (providing that drug
sponsors may receive an additional six-month period if they satisfy all of the other
requirements of this section).
59. See National Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37, 39-40 (D.D.C.
1999) (ruling that the term “drug” in FDAMA Section 111 should be interpreted as
active moiety).
60. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (1999) (defining “active moiety” as “the molecule
or ion, excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause a drug to be
an ester, salt . . . , or other noncovalent derivative . . . , responsible for the
physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance”).
61. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (CCH 18th ed. 1998) (listing the different types of drug
patents that exist and the drugs that are currently protected under those patent
categories).
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Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,62 commonly
referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act,63 or the Orphan Drug Act.64
Pursuant to the initiation of clinical studies, the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), after
determining that information about a drug may produce health
62. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (amending the FDCA to revise
procedures for new drug applications, amending Title 35 of the U.S.C., and
authorizing the extension of patents for certain regulated products).
63. The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to amend the pre-marketing
approval provisions of the FDCA to expedite the approval of generic copies of FDAapproved innovator products. See BEERS, supra note 9, § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-3 (indicating
that under the Hatch-Waxman Act, after the FDA first approves use of a chemical
entity for specific therapeutic purpose, later FDA approvals of the same chemical
entity for the same therapeutic purpose, but sold by different manufacturers, would
be expedited). Six exclusivity provisions were added to the Hatch-Waxman Act by
the innovator Industry shortly before Congress passed the Act. See id. § 4.02(A), at 44 (authorizing for human drugs: (1) ten years of market protection for new
chemical entities approved between January 1, 1982 and September 24, 1984; (2) two
years of protection for already approved entities approved during the above period;
(3) five years for new chemical entities approved post-period; (4) three years for new
drug applications for already approved drugs when the application “is supported by
new clinical investigations, conducted or sponsored by the applicant, that are
essential to approval”; (5) three years for supplemental new drug applications that
are supported “by new clinical investigations, conducted or sponsored by the
applicant, that are essential to approval”; and (6) delay of 180 days when abbreviated
new drug applicant challenges innovator product’s patent claims). These exclusivity
provisions served to placate the innovator Industry in light of concessions given to
the generic industry by extending various types of market protection to innovator
products. See id. at 4-3 to 4-4 (explaining that exclusivity provisions require generic
product manufacturers to include full safety and effectiveness data in their new drug
applications and because gathering such data requires time and expense, pioneer
manufacturers usually obtain exclusive marketing).
64. Pub. L. No. 97-414, §§ 1-4, 96 Stat. 2049, 2049-56 (1983) (codified in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The FDCA identifies drugs
for rare diseases or conditions. See FDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 526(a)(2)(A)-(B), 52
Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1994))
(defining “rare disease or condition” as one which affects fewer than 200,000 people
in the United States or one which affects more than 200,000 people in the United
States and for which drug sales are not reasonably expected to exceed drug
development costs). As drug manufacturers assume that rare diseases or conditions
infect fewer than 200,000 persons, it is not economically viable for them to pursue
treatment for such conditions without a market incentive. See BEERS, supra note 9,
§ 7.01 (discussing the development of the “orphan drug” designation). To
encourage the development of drugs for rare diseases and conditions, the Orphan
Drug Act created a seven year market exclusivity provision for drugs which meet
statutory and FDA criteria. See id. § 7.02 (stating that the first approval of “orphan
drug” bars subsequent FDA approval of competitors’ versions for seven years and
describing implications of orphan drug exclusivity).
FDAMA Section 111 exclusivity does not apply to most biological products and
antibiotics, which are regulated differently than human drugs. See Final Rule, supra
note 12, at 66,632 (1998) (“[B]ecause FDAMA exclusivity applies only to products
that have exclusivity or patent protection under the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act and the Orphan Drug Act, it provides no incentive to
conduct studies on certain categories of products, including most antibiotics,
biologies, and off-patent products.”).
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benefits among a pediatric population,65 must make a written request
to the drug sponsor for pediatric studies.66 The drug sponsor is
under no obligation to conduct pediatric studies and may do so only
to capitalize on the market exclusivity incentive.67 Pediatric studies
do not have to result in new labeling and do not have to show safety
and efficacy in pediatric patients.68
FDAMA Section 111 also directs the FDA to develop, publish, and
annually update a list of drugs for which additional pediatric
information may improve children’s health.69 For example, the FDA
announced the publication of the first list on May 20, 1998.70
Moreover, the FDA must report to Congress on the effectiveness and
adequacy of FDAMA Section 111, including suggestions for
modification, if appropriate, before January 1, 2001.71 FDAMA
65. See FDCA § 505A(b); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (Supp. 1997) (requiring the DHHS
to develop list of drugs which may produce healthy benefits in the pediatric
population and, thus, qualify for exclusivity).
66. See FDCA § 505A(d); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(d) (Supp. 1997) (stipulating the
various procedures and protocols involved in applications for pediatric exclusivity).
67. See CDER, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity under
Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, at 4 (Sept. 1999)
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm> (“Issuance of a written request to
a sponsor does not require the sponsor to conduct pediatric studies described in the
written request. It is the sponsor’s decision whether to conduct the studies and
possibly gain pediatric exclusivity”).
68. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 203 (1999) (indicating that the goal of the broad grant of
exclusivity is to get a maximum amount of useful pediatric information, and make
this information public).
The agency is endeavoring to get a maximum amount of useful pediatric
information as a result of the grant of exclusivity. The studies that are
submitted to gain exclusivity are not required to result in new labeling. They
do not have to show that the drug is safe or effective in the pediatric
population. FDA’s reading of the statute is that the intent of Congress was to
make this information public.
Id. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,633 (noting that the FDAMA does not
guarantee that studies conducted pursuant to FDAMA Section 111 will result in
improved pediatric labeling for two reasons: (1) eligibility for exclusivity is based on
submitting a study that is consistent with the FDA’s written request, not the
conclusiveness or usefulness of the results; and (2) sponsors are “not required to
obtain approval of a supplement adding the information gained in the study to the
drug’s label”).
69. See FDCA § 505A; 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (Supp. 1997) (requiring the Secretary
of the DHHS to consult with experts in pediatric research to develop and publish a
list of drugs that may qualify for pediatric exclusivity not later than 180 days from the
enactment of the FDAMA).
70. See Priority List, supra note 29, at 27,733 (indicating the availability of the first
draft of the Priority List, the list of drugs for which additional pediatric information
may produce health benefits in the pediatric population).
71. See FDCA § 505A(k); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(k) (Supp. 1997) (providing that the
FDA shall conduct a study and report to Congress not later than January 1, 2001).
The study and report shall examine all relevant issues, including—(1) the
effectiveness of the program in improving information about important
pediatric uses for approved drugs; (2) the adequacy of the incentive
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Section 111 market incentives currently are scheduled to expire on
January 1, 2002.72
C. The FDA’s Mandatory Final Rule
After the 1994 voluntary labeling rule failed to increase the
number of products on the market with pediatric labeling,73 the FDA
sought to guarantee the safety and effectiveness of drugs for pediatric
patients by requiring that sponsors both conduct pediatric studies
and include the results of those studies on product labels.74 The FDA
introduced the proposed rule on August 15, 1997.75
The
promulgation of the Final Rule occurred on December 2, 199876 and
took effect on April 1, 1999.77
provided under [Section 505A]; (3) the economic impact of the program on
taxpayers and consumers, including the impact of the lack of lower cost
generic drugs on patients, including on lower income patients; and (4) any
suggestions for modification that the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.
Id.
72. See FDCA § 505A(j); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(j) (Supp. 1997).
A drug may not receive any six-month period . . . unless the application for
the drug . . . is submitted on or before January 1, 2002. After January 1,
2002, a drug shall receive a six-month period . . . if—(1) the drug was in
commercial distribution as of the date of enactment of the Food and Drug
Modernization Act of 1997; (2) the drug was included by the Secretary on
the [Priority List] as of January 1, 2002; (3) the Secretary determines that
there is a continuing need for information relating to the use of the drug in
the pediatric population and that the drug may provide health benefits in
that population; and (4) all requirements of [Section 505A] are met.
Id.; see also FDA Likely to Interpret Pediatric Sunset Provision Broadly, FDA WEEK, July 9,
1999, at 1 (noting that the FDA plans to interpret the FDAMA Section 111 sunset
provision as broadly as possible to maximize pediatric research). The FDA has not
been specific as to how it will interpret the sunset provision, but intends to provide
detailed plans in an upcoming guidance document that will cover FDAMA Section
111 and the Final Rule. See id. (“FDA plans to clarify how the provision will be
interpreted in an upcoming guidance document covering exclusivity.”).
73. Both the Proposed and Final Rule note that the 1994 voluntary rule did not
remedy the dearth of pediatric labeling. See Proposed Rule: Regulations Requiring
Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological Products in
Pediatric Patients, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900, 43,902 (1997) (codified in scattered sections at
21 C.F.R. (1997)) [hereinafater Proposed Rule] (detailing the results of pediatric
labeling actions and the need for additional steps); see also Final Rule, supra note 12,
at 66,632-33 (citing data to indicate that voluntary efforts had not substantially
increased the number of products with adequate pediatric labeling).
74. See Proposed Rule, supra note 73, at 43,902–03 (describing the Proposed Rule);
see also Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,633 (stating that the Final Rule requires
manufacturers of new and marketed drugs and biological products to conduct
clinical studies on pediatric patients).
75. See Proposed Rule, supra note 73, at 43,900 (indicating date of proposal).
76. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632 (indicating date of issuance of the
Final Rule regulations).
77. See id. (indicating that the effective date of the Final Rule is April 1, 1999).
Although the Final Rule became effective on April 1, 1999, manufacturers do not
have to submit any mandated pediatric studies until December 1, 2000. See id.
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The Final Rule distinguishes new drugs from currently-marketed
drugs.78 Under the Final Rule, the FDA presumes that sponsors will
study all new drugs79 in pediatric patients unless they meet two waiver
criteria.80 The FDA concluded that sponsors with currently-marketed
products must conduct pediatric studies if: (1) the use of the
product among pediatric patients is great and the absence of labeling
would pose significant risks to those patients, and (2) the product’s
claimed indications would “represent a meaningful therapeutic
benefit over existing treatments” if studied in pediatric patients.81 If
the FDA determines that either a new or currently-marketed drug
provides a “meaningful therapeutic benefit” for pediatric patients,
then the sponsor must develop and test a pediatric formulation.82
Drug sponsors can waive this requirement when reasonable attempts
to develop a pediatric formulation have failed.83
(“Manufacturers must submit any required assessments of pediatric safety and
effectiveness twenty months after the effective date of the rule, unless the assessments
are waived or deferred by the FDA.”). The reason behind the compliance data is that
the FDA estimates that manufacturers will need twenty months to conduct pediatric
studies. See id. at 66,659. The FDA, however, has begun to require pediatric data in
certain instances for applications filed and pending as of April 1, 1999. See
Implementing the FDAMA Pediatric Study Incentive Provisions and the FDA’s
Mandatory Pediatric Study Rule: Comments of the PhRMA, 25 (Oct. 5, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the American University Law Review) (noting
significant confusion among the Industry and the FDA as to the application of the
effective date of the Final Rule).
78. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634-36 (distinguishing how the Final Rule
will apply to new and currently-marketed drugs and detailing the requirements that
such drugs must fulfill to comply with the Final Rule).
79. The FDA defined “new drugs” not only as “new chemical entities” or “new
(never-before-approved) biological products,” but also as currently-marketed drugs
with “new active ingredients, new indications, new dosage forms, new dosing
regimens, and new routes of administration for which an applicant seeks approval.”
Id. at 66,634. Thus, it recognizes that substantial changes to currently-marketed
products can have a significant therapeutic benefit for pediatric patients. See id.
(explaining that the expansion of scope was based on the observance that changes in
already marketed chemical entities can have as much or more therapeutic
significance for children than their original counterparts).
80. The two waiver criteria are: (1) the new drug will not be used in a
“substantial number of pediatric patients,” and (2) the new drug does not provide a
“meaningful therapeutic benefit” over currently existing treatments and therefore,
the absence of that information will not pose significant risk to pediatric patients. See
id. at 66,644 (including waiver where the necessary study is impossible, highly
impractical, or poses undue risks to pediatric patients).
81. See id. at 66,653-54 (noting the final form of the FDA’s two requirements that
trigger pediatric studies for currently-marketed products).
82. See id. at 66,652 (stating that the FDA believes that drugs and biologics that
offer meaningful therapeutic benefit to pediatric patients must provide pediatric
formulations that ensure the bioavailability and accurate dosing of those products).
83. See id. (indicating that the reason for the waiver is that producing pediatric
formulation can be difficult or impossible). The FDA will consider a number of
variables to determine whether a drug sponsor has made a reasonable attempt to
develop a pediatric formulation, including the importance of the product to
pediatric patients, the costs of developing a pediatric formulation, and the market
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The Final Rule is intended to be product-specific.84 Even though
FDAMA Section 111 applies to the active moiety of a drug product,
the Final Rule is limited to a specific indication for a specific drug
product.85 Insofar as FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule
overlap,86 the FDA will notify sponsors about the possibility of gaining
FDAMA market exclusivity.87
II. THE FDA’S QUESTIONABLE AUTHORITY AND INTENT TO MANDATE
PEDIATRIC STUDIES
Both FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule are meant to co-exist
in a symbiotic relationship and complement each another.88 The
FDA justifies issuing the Final Rule as a means to fill in various gaps

protection status of a drug. See id. (noting efforts to develop pediatric formulation
should increase with product importance and market protection and decrease with
the rise of costs). If a product has significant patent life remaining, then the FDA
will assume that a drug sponsor will be able to bear greater pediatric formulation
development costs. See id. (“FDA will assume that manufacturers can incur greater
costs for products that have significant patent life or exclusivity remaining.”).
84. See generally id. at 66,632 (explaining that the Final Rule applies to
manufacturers of “certain” drugs and biologics). The Final Rule applies to each new
drug, which is evaluated on an individual basis. See id. at 66,640. The FDA has
indicated that for currently-marketed drugs, it intends to require studies for specific
marketed products. See id. at 66,654.
85. See Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 55 (statement of
Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director of Pediatrics, FDA). Dr. Murphy stated
that:
[U]nder the rule studies are required. You need to evaluate the need for
pediatric information on only the drug product and indication being
reviewed at the time that that application is in house, versus FDAMA, the
studies are voluntary, you evaluate the need for pediatric information on the
entire moiety.
Id.
86. Both FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule overlap insofar as they both
apply to new and currently-marketed drugs. See FDCA § 505A(a), (c); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355a(a), (c) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing market exclusivity for new and
already marketed drugs); Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634-36 (highlighting
requirements of the Final Rule with respect to not yet approved products and
marketed products).
87. See Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 52-53 (statement
of Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director of Pediactrics, FDA) (noting that where
FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule overlap, the FDA will notify the
manufacturer to explore the possibilities of gaining FDAMA Section 111 exclusivity).
88. See generally id. at 34-56 (discussing the FDA’s views as to the relationship
between FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule, including how the Final Rule will
address gaps left by FDAMA Section 111, and the voluntary nature of FDAMA
Section 111 compared to the mandatory nature of the Final Rule). The PhRMA, an
Industry trade organization, recently requested from the FDA a more detailed
guidance document that specifically addresses the interrelationship between FDAMA
Section 111 and the Final Rule. See PhRMA Drafts Letter to FDA Listing Concerns with
Pediatric Policy, FDA WEEK, Aug. 13, 1999, at 1, 10 (expressing the Industry’s wish for
the FDA to issue a guidance document that will provide details on the interaction
between FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule).
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that FDAMA Section 111 does not address.89 The Industry believes
that the FDA lacks the legal authority to mandate pediatric studies,90
and if left unchallenged, the FDA will expand its authority further
after FDAMA Section 111 sunsets on January 1, 2002.91
A. The FDA’s Lack of Authority to Mandate Pediatric Testing
The Final Rule ignores history and precedent and seeks to expand
the FDA’s regulatory authority beyond the authority granted to it by
Congress.92 The FDA’s statutory justification for mandating pediatric
studies is a pastiche of statutory provisions that appears to give
legitimacy to the FDA’s position.93 Statutory analysis, case law, and
even remarks made by FDA officials support the proposition that the
FDA lacks the legal authority to mandate pediatric testing.
1.

The FDA’s misplaced reliance on statutory authority
The FDA relies on section 701(a) of the FDCA to buttress its

89. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,633 (stating that the FDA believes the
Final Rule is necessary to increase the number of drug and biological products that
have adequate labeling, despite the FDA’s expectations that FDAMA Section 111 will
provide a substantial incentive for sponsors to conduct pediatric studies). The Final
Rule identifies four specific gaps to help give legitimacy to the Final Rule:
(1) FDAMA exclusivity is limited to specific categories of products and excludes
“certain categories of antibiotics, biologics and off-patent products”; (2) the
voluntary nature of the FDAMA will leave many drugs and pediatric age groups
unstudied, as drug sponsors will target only the most profitable drugs; (3) the
FDAMA will not accomplish increased pediatric labeling in neonates, infants, and
young children because of the high costs to drug sponsors for clinical studies in
those pediatric populations; and (4) the FDAMA does not guarantee that the
information discovered in pediatric studies will appear on the product’s label, and
serves only an informational purpose. See id.
90. See infra Part II.A (arguing that the FDA lacks the authority to mandate
pediatric studies and noting the Industry’s concerns regarding the FDA’s authority).
91. Various statements made by the FDA and the Industry allude to the
Industry’s concern that after FDAMA Section 111 expires, the FDA will expand its
authority. See, e.g., Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 52-53
(statement of Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director of Pediatrics, FDA) (noting
the Industry’s concern that the Final Rule will overwhelm FDAMA Section 111);
Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, The Biotechnology Industry Organization, to
Jane E. Henney, M.D. Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration 1 (June 22,
1999) (on file with the American University Law Review) (urging that the FDA balance
and judiciously implement the Final Rule with respect to FDAMA Section 111).
92. Congress granted the FDA the authority to issue regulations for the efficient
enforcement of the FDCA. See FDCA § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994 & Supp.
1997). The FDA’s authority is limited, however, insofar as any agency actions must
reasonably relate to the purposes of the FDCA. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing how a regulation issued
under section 701(a) of the FDCA will be sustained so long as it is reasonably related
to the purposes of the FDCA).
93. See infra Part II.A.1 (arguing that the FDA pieces together numerous statutory
provisions to support its asserted authority to mandate pediatric testing).
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argument for mandated studies.94 This section authorizes the FDA to
issue regulations for the “efficient enforcement of the [FDCA].”95
Even an expansive interpretation of the FDA’s cited statutory
authority to mandate pediatric studies cannot accommodate FDA’s
propositions for new or currently-marketed drugs.96
a.

New drugs

The FDA has historically interpreted section 505 of the FDCA97 to
allow drug sponsors to select the “conditions of use”98 for which a
drug will be labeled and marketed.99 This statutory interpretation
94. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,657 (stating that section 701(a) of the
FDCA is the basis of the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric studies for drug
manufacturers). The FDA also relies on section 351 of the Public Health Service Act
to require manufacturers of biologics to conduct pediatric studies. See id. Section 31
of the Public Health Service Act requires that all biological products be “safe, pure,
and potent” to obtain a license to manufacture or prepare biological products. See
Public Health Service Act § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(B)(i)(II) (Supp. 1997).
95. See FDCA § 701(a); 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (“The authority
to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of [the FDCA], except as
otherwise provided in [section 701 of the FDCA], is hereby vested in the Secretary
[of the Department of Health and Human Services].”); See Nova Scotia Food, 568 F.2d
at 246 (noting that consonant with the Supreme Court’s determination that because
the language of the [FDCA] should not be read restrictively, but rather in a manner
consistent with the act’s purpose of protecting the public health, a regulation issued
under section 701(a) of the [FDCA] will be sustained so long as it is reasonably
related to the purposes of the act).
96. See generally Letter from Bonnie J. Goldmann, M.D., Vice President
Regulatory Affairs, Merck & Co., Inc., to FDA Dockets Management Branch, Docket
No. 97N-0165, at 3 (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file at the FDA Dockets Management Branch
in Rockville, MD) (arguing that the FDCA does not authorize the FDA to require
pediatric studies either for new drugs or currently-marketed drugs); Letter from Alan
F. Holmer, President, PhRMA, to FDA Dockets Management Branch, Docket No.
97N-0165, at attachment 14 (Nov. 13, 1997) (on file at the FDA Dockets
Management Branch in Rockville, MD) [hereinafter Holmer Letter] (arguing that
because the FDCA does not authorize the FDA to require manufacturers to submit
proposed labeling, it lacks the authority to mandate the Industry to conduct safety
and effectiveness studies for uses of a drug not selected by the manufacturer). But see
Letter from Susie Zeegen, Pediatric AIDS Foundation, to Michael A. Friedman, M.D.,
Lead Deputy Commissioner, FDA Docket No. 97N-0165, at 2 (May 13, 1998) (on file
at the FDA Dockets Management Branch in Rockville, MD) (“The authority outlined
by the FDA along with the proposed rule is a clear articulation of one legal basis for
the agency’s actions. . . .”).
97. See FDCA § 505; 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (stating the statutory
requirements that apply to drugs not yet approved by the FDA for introduction into
the U.S. marketplace).
98. Id. § 505(d), (e); 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d), (e) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (stating the
conditions under which a new drug application cannot be approved or will be
withdrawn if the necessary safety and effectiveness information is not included by the
manufacturer for FDA review).
99. See, e.g., American Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (ruling that the FDA was limited to the drug sponsor’s intended uses in the
approved labeling to determine the product’s safety and effectiveness). But see 37
Fed. Reg. 16,503 (1972) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130 (1972)) (stating that the FDA
could require NDA sponsors to supplement their applications with research and
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receives additional support in subsequent sections of the FDCA,
which empower drug sponsors to develop and submit to the FDA
labeling information for FDA evaluation and approval “under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the [drug
sponsor’s] proposed labeling.”100
The FDA argues that it possesses the authority to mandate pediatric
studies or to deem a product without adequate pediatric labeling as
mislabeled under sections 502(a),101 502(f),102 and 505(d)(7)103 of the
FDCA, and under sections 201.5104 and 201.128105 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (“CFR”).106
Section 502(a) of the FDCA
stipulates that product labeling cannot be “false or misleading.”107
Section 201(n) of the FDCA defines mislabeling as labeling that “fails
to reveal factual material . . . with respect to consequences . . . under
such conditions for use as are customary or usual.”108 The FDA
contends that drug products prescribed to pediatric patients on an
off-label basis become customary and usual conditions under which
investigations necessary to support off-label uses).
100. FDCA § 505(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997); see also id.
§ 505(d)(2), (4), (5); 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(2), (4), (5) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (noting
various subsequent sections of the FDCA that relate to “conditions of use”
information required of drug manufacturers when they submit new drug
applications to the FDA).
101. See id. § 502(a); 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (stating that a drug
is misbranded if it has a false or misleading label and how the health care economic
information should be made available to the Secretary).
102. See id. § 502(f); 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1994) (noting when the Secretary shall
promulgate regulations exempting drugs from having directions for use or warnings
on the label).
103. See id. § 505(d)(7); 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (explaining
when the Secretary shall refuse an application for a new drug).
104. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1999) (illustrating how to have adequate directions for
use of a drug).
105. See id. § 201.128 (explaining how a drug should be labeled with the intended
uses of the drug).
106. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,657 (noting the various statutory
provisions under which the FDA has the authority to mandate pediatric studies).
107. See FDCA § 502(a); 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (“A drug or
device shall be deemed to be misbranded—(a) If its labeling is false or misleading in
any particular.”).
108. Id. § 201(n); 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994). In full, the section states:
If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling or advertising is
misleading, then in determining whether the labeling or advertising is
misleading there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any
combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising
fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material
with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the article to
which the labeling or advertising relates under the conditions of use
prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions of
use as are customary or usual.
Id.
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the product is used.109 The FDA further contends that the absence of
information on the customary and usual conditions of use on a
product’s label denotes false or misleading labeling.110
Sponsors of a New Drug Application (“NDA”) cannot predict the
customary or usual conditions of use of their product because the
drug product is not yet approved.111 Following the FDA’s logic, drug
sponsors will be responsible for predicting all off-label uses of a
product and conducting clinical studies so that such information can
be included on the product’s labeling. Thus, if the drug sponsor fails
to study any potential off-label use, then the product will be
mislabeled and subject the drug sponsor to FDA enforcement
action.112
It clearly is neither the intent nor an acceptable
interpretation of section 505 to mandate that drug sponsors predict
off-label uses of unapproved new products to gain FDA approval.113
The FDA unsuccessfully attempts to differentiate off-label uses of a
product from pediatric uses.114
In the Final Rule, the FDA
commented that it possesses the authority to mandate pediatric
studies for customary or usual uses of drugs, but not for conditions a
manufacturer does not include in a product’s label.115 The customary
109. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,657 (“In determining the intended uses of
a drug for which it must be adequately labeled, [the] FDA may consider both the
uses for which it is expressly labeled and those for which the drug is commonly
used.”).
110. See id. at 66,658 (referring to section 201(n), the FDA stated that “the agency
has authority to require a manufacturer to establish the safety and effectiveness of,
and adequately label its product for, use of the product in a subpopulation for which
the product is not labeled if that use is common or suggested in the labeling”).
111. See Holmer Letter, supra note 96, at 14 (“Even with unlimited resources,
manufacturers cannot study all of the varied uses that physicians might make of
prescription drug products.”).
112. See, e.g., FDCA §§ 201(p), 301(a), (d), 505(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 331(a),
(d), 355(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (stating that various provisions of the FDCA that
prohibit the introduction of misbranded products into interstate commerce); Final
Rule, supra note 12, at 66,657 (noting the statutory consequences for violations of the
Final Rule).
113. See American Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(ruling that the FDA was limited to the drug sponsor’s intended uses in the approved
labeling to determine the product’s safety and effectiveness); see also James M. Beck
& Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 78 (1998) (noting various statements made
by the FDA where it states that it does not regulate off-label uses).
114. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,658 (noting the applicability of the Final
Rule to off-label uses but not to the use of a product for conditions not included in
the label).
115. See id. Specifically, the FDA noted that
it has the authority to require pediatric studies of drugs . . . that have or are
expected to have clinically significant use among pediatric patients for the
claimed indications. The agency has not examined evidence concerning the
use of approved products for diseases or conditions not in the label, and the
rule does not apply to those situations.
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or usual use in pediatric patients of drugs approved for indications in
adults are “use[s] of approved products for diseases or conditions not
in the label.”116 Therefore, the FDA admits that it does not possess
the authority to mandate pediatric studies of possible off-label uses of
new drug products in pediatric populations.
b.

Currently-marketed drugs

The FDA’s justification to mandate pediatric studies of new
products mirrors its arguments to mandate pediatric studies of
currently-marketed drug products.117 Here, the FDA supports its
authority on section 505(k) of the FDCA.118 Unlike new products that
are in the process of seeking FDA approval, currently-marketed
products are FDA-approved and already may have developed
“customary or usual”119 off-label uses among medical practitioners.
The same false dichotomy between off-label use and “clinical[ly]
significant use among pediatric patients”120 discussed in the context of
new drugs is applicable to currently-marketed drugs.121 The FDA
noted in the Final Rule that “[t]he agency has not examined [offlabel] use of approved drugs . . . and the rule does not apply to those
situations.”122 Therefore, the FDA’s claim of authority over drug
sponsors to mandate pediatric studies in currently-marketed drugs
also is misplaced.
Two further objections remain with respect to the FDA’s statutory
justification to mandate pediatric studies for currently-marketed
products.123 First, the FDA’s reliance on section 201.5 of the CFR is
Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 66,657 (noting the FDA’s statutory authority to mandate pediatric
studies for currently-marketed drugs).
118. See FDCA § 505(k); 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (1994) (discussing how an applicant
for a new drug has to maintain reports and records and how these records need to
be accessible to the Secretary).
119. See id. § 201(n); 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994) (evaluating a product’s
“customary or usual” use as a factor when determining misleading labeling or
advertising).
120. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,658 (stating the FDA’s distinction between
off-label use of a drug and a drug which has a clinically significant use due to
customary or usual use).
121. See supra Part II.A.1.a (explaining the FDA’s false distinction between off-label
use and clinically significant use of a drug for new drugs).
122. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,658.
123. Not discussed in this Comment is the applicability of the Final Rule to
generic copies of approved drugs. With respect to generic drugs, the Final Rule
makes apparently contradictory remarks. See id. at 66,640-41. The Final rule initially
states, “[t]his rule does not impose any requirements on studies submitted in support
of applications for generic copies of approved drugs that meet the requirements of
section 505(j) of the [FDCA].” Id. at 66,640. In a subsequent statement, however,
the FDA remarks that:
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generally applicable to over-the-counter (“OTC”)124 drug products.125
Thus, applying those labeling provisions to prescription products is
contrary to FDA’s historical application of this provision. Second, the
FDA’s alleged authority to remedy omissions or misleading
information on drug labeling by appropriating capital from drug
sponsors to conduct costly clinical studies through a mandatory rule
can be accomplished through less intrusive means. The drug sponsor
can remedy label omissions or misleading statements of material facts
by simply revealing the material fact.126 Both of these objections
further demonstrate the FDA’s misplaced reliance on statutory
authority to justify mandating drug sponsors to conduct pediatric
studies.
2.

FDA officials’ acknowledgment of the FDA’s lack of authority to mandate
pediatric testing
At a 1992 annual meeting of the AAP, former FDA Commissioner
David Kessler noted the FDA’s lack of authority to mandate pediatric
testing.127 Although the FDA does not question the accuracy of
petitions submitted under section 505(j)(2)(C) [of the FDCA] for a change
in active ingredient, dosage form, or route of administration may be denied
if “investigations must be conducted to show the safety and effectiveness of”
the change. Thus, if a petition is submitted for a change that would require
a pediatric study under this rule, the petition may be denied.
Id. at 66,641. What these dueling statements appear to do is eviscerate, or pre-empt,
parts of the FDCA that apply to generic drugs.
124. OTC drug products are products that do not require a prescription from a
physician to be purchased or used. The FDA does not regulate OTC products like
prescription drugs. See generally BEERS, supra note 9, § 1.05[D] (discussing OTC
review process and how it differs from prescription drugs).
125. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1999) (setting forth how adequately to give directions
for the use of a drug on the label).
126. A statement such as, “[s]afety and effectiveness in pediatric patients have not
been established” is sufficient to remedy a section 201.5 violation. See Specific
Requirements on Content and Format, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,240 (1994) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(9)(vi) (1994)).
127. Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler stated:
Despite the ardent desire of the FDA to increase pediatric indications, I need
to acknowledge the limits of FDA’s authority. It is our job to review drug
applications for the indications suggested by the manufacturer. We do not
have the authority to require manufacturers to seek approval for indications
which they have not studied . . . . Thus, as a matter of law, if an application
contains indications only for adults, we’re stuck.
Holmer Letter, supra note 96, at 13 (citing remarks by David A. Kessler, M.D., Annual
Meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics, at 1 (Oct. 14, 1992). Although not
specific to the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric studies, the FDA, as far back as
1967 said the following:
It should be noted that the burden of proving the safety and effectiveness of
a new drug—or of new uses of an already approved drug—rests on the
manufacturer. It is the manufacturer who chooses the indications to be
investigated and determines the dosage level for which he will seek FDA
approval. It is the duty of the Food and Drug Administration under the law
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Commissioner David Kessler’s remarks, it argues that, under a
longstanding policy, informal expressions of opinion made by its
employees do not represent the FDA’s position and therefore, are
not binding on the FDA.128
Recent litigation suggests, however, that remarks made by FDA
officials, although not binding, are important in considering FDA
authority. For example, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA,129
the Fourth Circuit used statements by former FDA Commissioner
Charles Edwards, as well as Congress’ intended delegation of powers
to the FDA, to help determine the FDA’s lack of authority to regulate
tobacco as a drug.130 The court ruled that the Commissioner’s
statements carried significant authority, and clarified the FDA’s
jurisdiction and authority to regulate tobacco.131 Similarly, a court
can consider former Commissioner David Kessler’s statements, as well
as Congress’ intended function of the FDA as reviewer and approver
of submitted test results, as indicative of the FDA’s lack of statutory
authority to mandate drug sponsors to conduct pediatric studies.132
to decide that proposed usages and levels are both safe and effective, based
on the data submitted by the manufacturer.
Id. at 13-14 (citing John Jennings, M.D., The Rx Label: Basis for all Prescribing
Information, 1 FDA Papers 14-15 (Nov. 1967)).
128. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,657 (noting that even comments by an
FDA Commissioner are not binding on the FDA). The FDA argues that according to
21 C.F.R. section 10.85(k) “[a] statement or advice given by an FDA employee
orally . . . is an informal communication that . . . does not necessarily represent the
formal position of FDA, and does not bind or otherwise obligate or commit the
agency to the views expressed.” 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(k) (1999).
129. 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
130. When Congress later examined the issue of the FDA’s jurisdiction during its
consideration of tobacco-specific legislation, FDA Commissioner Charles Edwards
testified regarding the FDA’s lack of authority over cigarettes and stated that “if
cigarettes were to be classified as drugs, they would have to be removed from the
market because it would be impossible to prove they were safe for their intended
[use].” Id. at 168 (quoting Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce on S. 1454, 92d Cong., 239 (1972) (alteration in original)). Again in
1989, the FDA Commissioner stated that:
it doesn’t look like it is possible to regulate [tobacco products] under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act even though smoking, I think, has been
widely recognized as being harmful to human health. . . . The above
statements evidence the FDA’s position . . . that, as a matter of law, it did not
have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed.
Id. at 169-70 (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Rural Dev., Agric., and Related
Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 409 (1989) (statement of
FDA Commissioner Jere E. Goyan) (alteration in original)). See generally Richard A.
Merrill, The FDA May Not Regulate Tobacco Products as “Drugs” or as “Medical Devices”, 47
DUKE L.J. 1071, 1074-82 (1998) (analyzing the history of the FDA’s assertions that it
did not have the authority to regulate tobacco and tobacco products).
131. See Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 170-71 (relying on the FDA’s numerous
testimonies at congressional hearings to clarify whether the FDA has authority to
regulate tobacco).
132. Just as the FDA Commissioner’s statements persuaded the Brown &
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B. The FDA’s Intention to Expand Pediatric Testing Requirements After
FDAMA Section 111 Sunsets
FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule are intended to operate in
tandem.133 The Industry, however, must carefully monitor the FDA as
it continues to fashion the two policies to ensure that the Final Rule
does not engulf FDAMA Section 111.134 Various indicators exist that
can be construed as an attempt by the FDA to use FDAMA Section
111 to lure the Industry with the carrot of market exclusivity to
conduct pediatric studies and then, subsequently subject the Industry
to the authority of the Final Rule after FDAMA Section 111 sunsets
on January 1, 2002.135
1.

The FDA’s issuance of similar criteria for pediatric testing under the
mandatory rule and FDAMA Section 111
Although all innovator drug products with current patent
exclusivity136 are considered candidates for a six month patent
extension under FDAMA Section 111,137 Congress required the FDA
to publish a list of priority drugs that qualify for pediatric
exclusivity.138 The FDA consulted with experts in pediatric research
and other interested parties, and developed a draft list and
qualifications.139 In June 1998, the FDA published a final list
Williamson court that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate tobacco, see id.
at 176, a court considering the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric studies might
be persuaded by the FDA Commissioner’s statements regarding the FDA’s lack of
authority to mandate pediatric studies.
133. See Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 122 (statement of
Dr. Daniel Notterman) (describing that the Final Rule and the FDAMA complement
each other and can be applied in a synergistic fashion); see also FDA, Background
Paper—Potential Benefits of Pediatric, at 24 (Apr. 1998) (“The interaction of the
FDAMA incentives with pediatric rule requirements is likely to be complex and
uncertain . . . .”) (source available from FDA).
134. The FDA has indicated that it intends to issue a future guidance document
that will clarify how FDAMA Section 111 and the Final Rule are to operate together.
See FDA Likely to Interpret Pediatric Sunset Provision Broadly, FDA WEEK, July 9, 1999, at 12.
135. See Wechsler, supra note 21, at 20 (“[C]ompanies fear that FDAers who prefer
the mandatory approach will delay implementing the voluntary program in an effort
to ‘run out the clock’ instead of permitting the incentive program to work in its fairly
short four-year trial run.”).
136. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (clarifying drugs that qualify for
patent exclusivity under current law).
137. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632 (explaining that FDAMA Section 111
exclusivity can only attach to drugs with current exclusivity under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act and the Orphan Drug Act).
138. See FDCA § 505A(b), 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (Supp. 1997) (stating that the FDA
should consult with experts in pediatric research to develop and annually update a
“list of approved drugs for which additional pediatric information may produce
health benefits in the pediatric population”).
139. See Notice, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,815 (1998) (giving notice of the FDA’s
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(“Priority List”) that will be updated on an annual basis.140 The
Priority List identifies three criteria for qualification:141 (1) the drug
product must be a “significant improvement compared to marketed
products;”142 (2) the drug must be prescribed at least 50,000 times
each year;143 and (3) the drug must be in a class of drugs with a dearth
of pediatric information.144
“The final rule established a presumption that all new drugs and
biologics will be studied in pediatric patients,”145 but allows waivers in
certain circumstances.146 All currently-marketed drugs that fulfill two
criteria are required to conduct pediatric studies:147 (1) drugs used in
a “substantial number of pediatric patients,”148 defined as 50,000
pediatric patients,149 and (2) drugs that may provide a “meaningful
development of a draft list of drugs to be considered for pediatric exclusivity).
140. See Priority List, supra note 29, at 27,733. The Priority List is a list of approved
drugs that the FDA believes might produce health benefits in the pediatric
population and therefore, for which additional pediatric information is necessary.
See id.
141. In full, the qualifications are:
The drug product, if approved for use in the pediatric population, would be
a significant improvement compared to marketed products labeled for use in
the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease in the relevant pediatric
population . . . ; or,
The drug is widely used in the pediatric population, as measured by at least
50,000 prescription mentions per year; or,
The drug is in a class or for an indication for which additional therapeutic or
diagnostic options for the pediatric population are needed.
Priority List, supra note 29.
142. Id.
143. See id. The requirement that a drug be “mentioned” 50,000 times a year
includes numerous prescription refills for a single patient. See Final Rule, supra note
12, at 66,647. This method can dilute the actual number of pediatric patients using a
particular drug.
144. See Priority List, supra note 29.
145. Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634.
146. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting the criteria a drug sponsor
must fulfill to be exempt from the Final Rule). But see Letter from Arthur J.
Ammann, M.D., American Foundation for AIDS Research (“AmFAR”), to FDA
Dockets Management Branch, Docket No. 97N-0165, at 1-4 (Nov. 11, 1997) (on file
at the FDA Dockets Management Branch in Rockville, MD) (arguing that the FDA
weakens its authority to mandate pediatric studies by allowing waivers in certain
circumstances).
147. In full, the requirements are:
[D]rugs and biological products that: (1) [a]re used in a substantial number
of pediatric patients for the claimed indications, and where the absence of
adequate labeling could pose significant risks; or (2) would provide a
meaningful therapeutic benefit over existing treatments for pediatric
patients, and the absence of adequate labeling could pose significant risks to
pediatric patients.
Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 66,647 (“Physician mentions of drugs for pediatric use generally fall
either below 15,000 per year or above 100,000 per year . . . . FDA has therefore
chosen 50,000 as the cut-off for a substantial number of pediatric patients.”).
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therapeutic benefit over existing treatments”150 and would jeopardize
a pediatric patient’s health without adequate pediatric labeling.151
The FDAMA’s Priority List qualifications are narrow enough to fall
within the broader requirements of the Final Rule.152 After the
FDAMA’s market incentives expire on January 1, 2002, drugs listed
on the Priority List that failed to earn six months of market
exclusivity due to insufficient time to complete studies or the FDA’s
lack of expediency153 will be required de facto to conduct pediatric
studies. Although the original purpose of the Final Rule is to act as a
gap-filler for FDAMA Section 111, after market incentives sunset in
2002, the Final Rule will be the only remaining regulation.154
Expanding the reach of the Final Rule as a consequence of National
Pharmaceutical Alliance v. Henney
In a recent case, National Pharmaceutical Alliance v. Henney,155 the
generic industry156 challenged the FDA’s definition of “drug” in
section 355A of the FDCA and sought an injunction to prevent the
FDA from issuing written requests for pediatric testing.157 The
plaintiffs contended that the FDA should define “drug” narrowly to

2.

150. Id. at 66,634.
151. See id. (stating that the Final Rule requires pediatric studies of market drugs
and biological products that in the absence of adequate labeling could pose
significant risks to pediatric patients).
152. See CDER, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity under
Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, at 17 (Sept. 1999), available at
<http://www.fda.gov.cder/guidance/index.htm> (“A sponsor could conduct a study
that is adequate to meet the requirements of the pediatric rule but that does not
meet the terms of a Written Request.”); see also Analysis of the Pediatric Rule, THE FOOD
& DRUG LETTER, Oct. 1, 1999, at 2 (noting that “[o]nce that grace period ends, the
whip could come down for products now granted exclusivity under [FDAMA]”).
153. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the FDA’s lack of expediency in granting six
months of extended market exclusivity under FDAMA Section 111).
154. The imagery created by the requirements to qualify for FDAMA Section 111
exclusivity and to trigger compliance with the Final Rule is that of two concentric
circles. The inner circle is the requirements for FDAMA Section 111 exclusivity. The
outer circle is the requirements stipulated in the Final Rule. Once FDAMA Section
111 exclusivity sunsets, the inner circle disappears, leaving the drugs previously
subject to FDAMA Section 111 subject to the requirements of the Final Rule.
155. 47 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 1999).
156. The Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association (“GPIA”) joined The
National Pharmaceutical Alliance (“NPA”) as plaintiffs. See id. at 37. Both
organizations are trade organizations that represent the collective opinion of their
membership—manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical products.
157. See id. at 38. The generic industry sought to enjoin the FDA from issuing
pediatric requests to the Industry because a broad definition of the term “drug” as
active moiety would allow the Industry to gain market exclusivity for an entire line of
products containing a single active moiety. See id. at 39. This would have the effect
of preventing the generic industry from introducing any product containing the
active moiety identified by the FDA as one that qualifies for FDAMA Section 111
exclusivity.
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denote a single pharmaceutical product.158 The FDA and the
Industry159 argued that “drug” should be defined broadly to mean
active moiety.160 The district court held that under Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,161 the FDA possessed adequate
discretionary authority to interpret “drug” as active moiety rather
than as single product.162
By defining drug as active moiety under section 355A, the FDA now
has the opportunity under the Final Rule to expand pediatric testing
to entire classes of currently-marketed drugs and their indications.
The Final Rule generally requires pediatric testing for an indication
of a specific drug product.163 The FDA, however, specifically
broadened the scope of the Final Rule to include new drug active
moieties.164 Inherently listed in the Priority List are not only the
drugs currently indicated, but all of the drugs in which that active
moiety exists. After FDAMA Section 111 sunsets in 2002, the FDA can
158. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for
Preliminary Injunction at 2, National Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37
(D.D.C. 1999) (arguing that the term “drug” is limited to a specific drug product
rather than a drug substance, which connotes an active moiety). The FDA’s
regulations define “drug product” as “a finished dosage form . . . that contains a drug
substance, generally, but not necessarily, in association with one or more other
ingredients.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (1999). The FDA’s regulations also define “drug
substance” as “the active ingredient intended to furnish the desired pharmaceutical
effect.” Id.
159. PhRMA intervened in this case. See National Pharm. Alliance, 47 F. Supp. 2d at
38 n.1 (noting that the court granted the PhRMA’s unopposed permissive
intervention as a defendant). The AAP also attempted to intervene on behalf of the
defendants, but the court denied the AAP’s motion. See id. at 41 (holding that the
AAP’s interests were adequately represented by existing parties).
160. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application
for Preliminary Injunction at 10-11, National Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp.
2d 37 (D.D.C. 1999) (arguing that the “close nexus” between the Hatch-Waxman
Act, where “drug” is defined as active moiety, and FDAMA Section 111 implies that
“drug” is defined as active moiety under FDAMA Section 111).
161. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (establishing a two-part test to review an agency’s
construction of a statute that it administers). The two-part test considers:
(1) “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and
(2) “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” See id. at 842-43. The court in National Pharm. Alliance determined that the
answer to the first question was no and the answer to the second question was yes.
See National Pharm. Alliance, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40.
162. National Pharm. Alliance, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 40. The District Court’s opinion
will likely be the final ruling on the issue of the definition of “drug” in FDAMA
Section 111, as the generic industry will not appeal the case. See NPA, GPIA Decide not
to Appeal Ruling Favoring FDA in Pediatrics Case, FDA WEEK, Apr. 23, 1999, at 1, 10
(discussing both the NPA’s and the GPIA’s decision not to appeal the District Court’s
ruling, citing both the high cost of litigation and the small chance that an appeal
would result in a different ruling as the reason for their decisions).
163. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,634.
164. See id. The Final Rule also expands the scope of the rule to include new
indications, new dosage forms, new dosing regimens, and new routes of
administration. See id.
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argue successfully that, as all drugs mentioned in the Priority List,
which it created with the intent to define “drug” as active moiety,
meet the requirements to trigger mandatory pediatric studies,165 it is
only logical that all products containing the active moieties of drugs
on the Priority List also meet the requirements that trigger
mandatory pediatric studies. Expanding the reach of the Final Rule
to include new drug active moieties would strengthen the FDA’s
justification for broadening the scope of the Final Rule to
incorporate drugs previously covered under FDAMA Section 111.
3.

The FDA’s lack of expediency in granting market exclusivity under
FDAMA Section 111
The FDA is slow to grant the market exclusivity incentives promised
in FDAMA Section 111.166 From November 1997 to May 1999, the
FDA granted only five (5) six month patent extensions.167 This lack of
expediency in granting exclusivity has caused the innovator Industry
to speculate that the FDA prefers to exhaust the potential of FDAMA
Section 111 market incentives and allow the Final Rule to take
effect.168 The FDA’s lack of expediency is attributed to time and
budgetary constraints.169 These excuses, however, are inconsistent
with the FDA’s stated priority to provide better health care for
children.170 If the FDA’s priority is to provide better health care for
children, then that, instead of time and budgetary concerns, should
be the guiding principle behind granting exclusivity.

165. See supra Part II.B.1 (asserting that FDAMA Section 111 requirements fall
within the Final Rule requirements to mandate pediatric studies).
166. See Pediatric Exclusivity Statistics (last modified Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.fda.gov.cder/pediatric/wrstats.htm> (cataloging the number of
proposed pediatric study requests (“PPSR’s”), the number of PPSR’s acted upon, and
the total PPSR’s pending action for various drugs).
167. See Dianne Murphy, M.D., Exclusivity Statistics (last modified July 2, 1999)
<http://www.fda.gov.cder/present/dia-699/mu2-dia99/index.htm>. The web site
refers to a presentation made at the FDA by Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate
Director for Pediatrics, FDA, to update interested parties on the progress of FDAMA
Section 111.
168. See Wechsler, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing companies’ fear that the FDA
prefers the mandatory approach and that this preference will delay the
implementation of the voluntary program in an effort to prevent the program from
working in its four year trial run).
169. See Rep. Greenwood Questions FDA Pediatric Review Allocation of Resources, THE
PINK SHEET, May 31, 1999, at 6 (expressing Congressional concern for the FDA’s
failure to grant exclusivity under FDAMA Section 111 and attributing it to poor
allocation of resources).
170. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632 (discussing the history of FDA
initiatives to improve childrens’ health through more effective labeling and
prescription regulations).
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C. A Legal Challenge from the Industry Contesting the Validity of the FDA’s
Authority to Mandate Pediatric Testing Would be Imprudent on the Part of
the Innovator Industry
In light of the arguments against the FDA’s statutory authority to
mandate pediatric studies,171 a strong possibility exists that the
innovator Industry will initiate court proceedings against the FDA.172
Although it is likely to prevail on the merits, an Industry challenge to
the FDA’s authority may result in a loss of the opportunity to
capitalize on any successes FDAMA Section 111 accrues.173 Moreover,
such a challenge may have the adverse side-effect of coalescing public
support against the Industry.174
1.

The FDAMA would likely sunset and no pediatric testing would occur
If the innovator Industry chooses to initiate a legal challenge
against the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric studies under the
Final Rule, it will harm all parties with interests at stake.175 Litigation
171. See supra Part II.A (arguing that the FDA lacks the authority to mandate
pediatric studies).
172. Various comments submitted to the FDA regarding its authority to mandate
pediatric studies suggest the possibility that the Industry would seek to enjoin the
FDA from implementing the Final Rule. See supra note 96 and accompanying text
(challenging the FDA’s legal basis for mandating pediatric studies under the Final
Rule and alluding to the possibility of legal action). In addition, the FDA has
acknowledged the likelihood of a legal challenge from the Industry. See AntiInfective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 179 (statements of Mr. Tim
Westmoreland, Esq., Public Policy Representative, Elizabeth Glasser Pediatric Aids
Foundation) (stating that the PhRMA is considering, or has considered, a lawsuit
challenging the FDA’s authority to implement the Final Rule).
173. See infra notes 175-76.
174. The Industry’s reluctance to adhere to the requirements of the Final Rule
has already begun to coalesce negative reactions. See, e.g., Letter from Arthur J.
Ammann, M.D., AmFAR, to FDA Dockets Management Branch, Docket No. 97N0165, at 3 (Nov. 11, 1997) (on file at the FDA Dockets Management Branch in
Rockville, MD) (“It is unfortunate that some members of the pharmaceutical
industry are already attempting to incite the public against the pediatric community
by suggesting that a requirement for pediatric data will slow drug development for
adults. This is offensive.”).
175. In the unlikely scenario that the FDA prevails in court, the decision would set
a precedent for the FDA to be able to appropriate private funds for any subpopulation whose medical treatment needs are not fulfilled by the Industry. For
example, the FDA could mandate studies and product labeling for geriatric patients,
AIDS patients, or pregnant women. In fact, the FDA has already proposed labeling
for geriatric patient populations. See Specific Requirements on Content and Format
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs; Addition of “Geriatric Use” Subsection in
the Labeling, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,313 (1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (1997))
(establishing a geriatric use subsection in prescription drug labeling); see also Medical
Policy Coordinating Comm. (“MPCC”), FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry: Content and
Format for Geriatric Labeling, at 1 (Dec. 1998), available at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/
guidance/index.htm> (providing guidance to the Industry on how to submit
geriatric labeling of human prescription drugs and biological labeling under the

2000]

FDAMA SECTION 111

769

is a lengthy and costly initiative for both sides. The Industry would
seek to enjoin implementation of the Final Rule during court
proceedings until a final decision is rendered. FDAMA Section 111
exclusivity, scheduled to sunset on January 1, 2002, would likely
expire before the conclusion of any litigation. In that event, the
innovator Industry will lose the opportunity to capitalize on the
successes of FDAMA Section 111. Of greatest concern, however, is
that without the FDAMA or the Final Rule, drug sponsors will not
conduct pediatric studies and children will once again become
“therapeutic orphans.”176 Thus, litigation is an imprudent course of
action for the Industry to pursue.
2.

A legal challenge would coalesce negative public sentiment
A legal challenge to the FDA’s authority to mandate pediatric
studies under the Final Rule could also have the potential effect of
coalescing negative public sentiment against the Industry.177 The
public might interpret Industry opposition to the Final Rule as
protecting only market interests while sacrificing pediatric health
care.178 Regardless of whether the Industry’s interests in defeating the
Final Rule are legally sound, the public likely will compare its
willingness to conduct pediatric studies for market incentives to its
unwillingness to conduct pediatric studies under a voluntary system.179
The FDA may argue that without sufficient voluntary compliance, the
only alternative that remains in light of the importance of pediatric
health is an attempt to mandate pediatric studies.180 Thus, the overall
newly established geriatric use subsection).
176. Without either FDAMA Section 111 or the Final Rule, the only remaining
regulation will be the 1994 “pediatric use” provision, which the FDA has already
labeled a failure. See Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Comm., supra note 20, at 29-30
(statement of Dianne Murphy, M.D., Associate Director of Pediatrics, FDA) (noting
the failure of the 1994 rule based on the fact that 77% of label submissions to the
FDA had no improvements in pediatric labeling).
177. Congress has introduced numerous bills caricaturizing the Industry as a
greedy business. See, e.g., Prescription Drug Fairness for Seniors Act of 1999, H.R.
664, 106th Cong. (1999) (alleging that prescription drug manufacturers engage in
discriminatory practices that compel Medicare beneficiaries to pay more for drugs
than the drug manufacturers’ most favored customers). Numerous bills have also
been introduced to create a Medicare drug benefit, which would force drug
manufacturers to sell their products at drastically reduced rates. See, e.g., Access to
Rx Medications in Medicare Act of 1999, S. 841, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing the
creation of a Medicare drug benefit to cover outpatient prescription drugs).
178. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary
Injunction, at 31-32, National Pharm. Alliance v. Henney, 47 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C.
1999) (arguing that Congress did not create FDAMA Section 111 to establish a
substantial economic benefit for innovator companies).
179. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting the failure of the 1994
rule).
180. See Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,632-33 (discussing the failure of the 1994
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effect of litigating the FDA’s authority to implement the Final Rule
would damage the Industry’s image by making it look like a health
care provider concerned about profits rather than the public’s wellbeing.181
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the success of FDAMA Section 111,182 a more prudent
course of action would be for the FDA and Industry members to
reach a consensus and seek an extension of FDAMA Section 111 for
an additional five years in exchange for assistance with off-patent
drug pediatric studies.183 Under an agreement designed to gain the
FDA’s support to re-authorize FDAMA Section 111 in exchange for
off-patent drug pediatric studies, the original sponsors of off-patent
drug products would work with the AAP and the federally-funded
Pediatric Pharmacology Research Units (“PPRUs”)184 of the National
Institute of Child Health and Development (“NIHCD”)185 to develop
voluntary rule and concluding that only a mandatory rule will accomplish the FDA’s
goal of increased substantive pediatric labeling).
181. The fact, however, is that the Industry is a dedicated health care provider. In
1999, the innovator Industry is reportedly developing 207 drugs for children. See New
Medicines in Development for Children, in PHRMA 1999 SURVEY 1.
182. At a recent conference, FDA officials declared that the impact of FDAMA
Section 111 “has been enormous.” Pediatric Studies Proposals Double Under FDAMA
Exclusivity, DICKINSON’S FDA REV., July 1999, at 15. The report continues to note that
“[f]rom 1991 to 1997, sponsors submitted 77 proposals for pediatric studies, but in
1998 they submitted 130,” and that the dramatic increase in pediatric studies is
attributable to the incentives offered in FDAMA Section 111. See id.
183. Off-patent drugs are important to pediatric health. For over three decades,
the AAP has sought pediatric studies and formulation of new drugs, currentlymarketed drugs, and off-patent drugs. See Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act and Food and Drug Administration Reform: Hearing before the House Commerce
Comm. Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 105th Cong. at 10-11 (1997)
(statement of Sanford N. Cohen, M.D., Associate Director of the National Institute
for Environmental Health Services at Wayne State University on behalf of AAP).
Whereas new and currently-marketed drugs are manufactured and sold for the
benefit of one patent holder, most off-patent drugs may have multiple manufacturers
and distributors. Therefore, legislative and regulatory proposals, such as FDAMA
Section 111 and the Final Rule, have focused on new and currently marketed drugs.
See, e.g, Final Rule, supra note 12, at 66,663. Many off-patent drugs, however, are
used in pediatric patients on an off-label basis. See Reauthorization of the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act and Food and Drug Administration Reform: Hearing before the House
Commerce Comm. Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 105th Cong. at 11 (1997)
(statement of Sanford N. Cohen, M.D., Associate Director of the National Institute
for Environmental Health Services at Wayne State University on behalf of AAP).
Pediatric studies of off-patent drugs would greatly enhance the array of therapies
available to pediatric patients, and would continue to provide incentives for the
Industry to conduct pediatric testing. See id. at 19.
184. The PPRU’s are a cooperative network of organizations that serve as a
resource for studies of drug action and disposition in infants, children and
adolescents. See National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (visited Sept.
10, 1999) <http://www.nichd.nih.gov/htm>.
185. The National Institute of Child Health and Development (“NIHCD”), a
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a list of important off-patent drugs that should be labeled for
pediatric use.186 The NICHD’s PPRUs would compile the information
and conduct pediatric studies, the results of which would appear on
product labeling.187
Both FDAMA Section 111 and its legislative history support such a
reauthorization.188 Original versions of the BPCA did not contain a
sunset provision189 and subsequent versions established a sunset date
of 2004.190 Most convincing is the argument that FDAMA Section 111
anticipated the need for reauthorization. FDAMA Section 111
stipulates that before January 1, 2001, the Secretary of the DHHS
must report to Congress on the progress made under the FDAMA
provision.191
The report should include any recommended
department of the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), administers numerous
research programs, including clinical research in pediatric patients. NIHCD would
be an ideal candidate to conduct the necessary research on off-patent drugs.
Original drug sponsors could lend assistance by providing the necessary scientific
and research information necessary for NIHCD to complete its studies. See Public
Meeting on FDA’s Proposed Regulations to Increase Pediatric Use Information for Drugs and
Biologics, Oct. 27, 1997 (visited Oct. 29, 1999) <http://www.fdc.gov/cder/meeting/
transcript/1027.ped.htm> (discussing novel approaches to obtaining pediatric
labeling for off-patent products, including a collaborative agreement between the
Industry, the FDA, and the PPRUs).
186. See Letter from John D. Siegfried, M.D., PhRMA, to FDA Dockets
Management Branch, Docket No. 97N-0165, at 4 (Nov. 13, 1997) (on file at the FDA
Dockets Management Branch in Rockville, MD) (stating that the PPRU’s of the
NICHD would be a good resource for developing ways to gather the information for
off-patent pediatric drugs).
187. See generally Sanford N. Cohen, M.D., The Pediatric Pharmacology Research Unit
(PPRU) Network and its role in Meeting Pediatric Labeling Needs, 104 PEDIATRICS 644
(1999) (providing an excellent overview and description of the history and
responsibilities of the PPRU network).
188. In fact, the American Medical Association’s (“AMA”) House of Delegates
supports extending FDAMA’s Section 111 incentive and has suggested that Congress
award drug manufacturers some type of market exclusivity for conducting pediatric
studies for off-patent drugs. See The American Med. Ass’n, H-120.961 Unlabeled
Indications of Food and Drug Administration-Approved Drugs, at 2 (1997) (stating that
“[l]egislation should be enacted that provides extensions of marketing exclusivity for
the product to manufacturers who complete pediatric studies that lead to pediatric
labeling,” and urging innovator companies to work with the NIH to ensure that offpatent drugs are studies in pediatric patients).
189. See, e.g., S. 3337, § 2, 102d Cong. (1992) (containing no sunset provision).
190. See, e.g., S. 713, § 3, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing that no market exclusivity
be granted for studies commenced after January 1, 2004).
191. See FDCA § 505A(a); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(a) (Supp. 1997).
The study and report shall examine all relevant issues, including—(1) the
effectiveness of the program in improving information about important
pediatric uses for approved drugs; (2) the adequacy of the incentive
provided under [Section 505A]; (3) the economic impact of the program on
taxpayers and consumers, including the impact of the lack of lower cost
generic drugs on patients, including on lower income patients; and (4) any
suggestions for modification that the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.
Id.
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modifications to Section III.192 Thus, the Secretary’s report should
include a recommendation that FDAMA Section 111 be re-authorized
in exchange for Industry assistance with off-patent drug pediatric
studies.
CONCLUSION
Almost eighty percent of all prescription drugs are not indicated
for use in pediatric patients. Both the Final Rule and FDAMA
Section 111 serve the purpose of increasing the number of
prescription drugs specifically indicated for use in pediatric patients.
The FDA’s solution to remedying the lack of pediatric labeling is to
mandate that drug manufacturers conduct pediatric studies.
Meanwhile, Congress currently seeks to provide incentives to drug
manufacturers, who conduct pediatric studies, by offering the
possibility of extended patent life. Both these initiatives, however, are
inherently troubled because the FDA does not possess the statutory
authority to mandate pediatric studies under the Final Rule and
Congress drafted FDAMA Section 111 to expire in 2001. Without the
existence of either initiative, the number of prescription drugs
indicated for pediatric patients will likely remain unchanged.
The FDA and the Industry should work together to reach a
consensus and reauthorize FDAMA Section 111 for an additional five
years in exchange for assistance with off-patent drug pediatric studies.
The success of FDAMA Section 111 proves that it can act as a vehicle
to increase the number of drugs for use in pediatric patients. In
exchange for the reauthorization of FDAMA Section 111, the FDA
would be able to accomplish its goal of providing pediatric
information for the entire universe of drug products—new drugs,
currently-marketed drugs, and off-patent drugs.
Of greatest
importance is that by fostering an atmosphere of cooperation
between the FDA and the Industry, children will no longer be treated
as “therapeutic orphans.”

192. See FDCA § 505A(k)(4); 21 U.S.C. § 355a(k)(4) (Supp. 1997).

